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Abstract: In 1905 Bertrand Russell took on the problem of definite de-
scriptions, and his analysis became the standard up until 1950 when Pe-
ter Strawson criticised Russell’s solution as inadequate. Since then 
many opponents as well as proponents of the Russellian solution have 
been involved in a long-term debate on definite descriptions. In this pa-
per I show that both sides of the contention are partly right and partly 
wrong, because sentences of the form “The F is a G” are ambiguous. 
However, the ambiguity does not concern reference shift of the descrip-
tion ‘the F’. Rather, the ambiguity consists in different topic-focus articu-
lations of a given sentence involving occurrences of ‘the F’. I demon-
strate that when ‘the F’ is used as part of the topic of such a sentence the 
existence of the object denoted by ‘the F’ is not only entailed by but also 
presupposed by the sentence. On the other hand, ‘the F’ used in the fo-
cus of a sentence triggers merely existential entailment. Thus sentences 
differing only in their topic-focus articulation should have assigned dif-
ferent logical forms. In order to make such hidden features explicit, I 
apply the procedural semantics of Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL), 
furnishing sentences with hyperpropositions that are precisely defined 
in terms of TIL constructions. These are procedures assigned to sentences 
as their context-invariant structured meanings. Moreover, I generalise 
the phenomenon of the topic-focus distinction to sentences of any form, 
proposing an adequate analytic schema of sentences that come with a 
presupposition. 
Keywords: definite description, topic-focus articulation, de dicto vs. de re 
supposition, structured meaning, procedural semantics, hyperproposi-
tion, TIL. 
 _______________________________________________________________  
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 1  Introduction 
 There is a substantial difference between proper names and definite 
descriptions. This distinction is of crucial importance due to their vastly 
different logical behaviour. Independently of any particular theory of 
proper names, it should be granted that a proper proper name (as op-
posed to a definite description grammatically masquerading as a proper 
name) is a rigid designator of a numerically particular individual. On the 
other hand, a definite description like, for instance, ‘the Mayor of Dune-
din’, ‘the King of France’, etc., offers an empirical criterion that enables us 
to establish which individual, if any, satisfies the criterion at a particular 
state of affairs. 
The contemporary discussion of the distinction between names and 
descriptions was triggered by Russell (1905).1 Russell’s key idea is the 
proposal that a sentence like 
 (1)  The F is a G 
containing a definite description ‘the F’, is understood to have the logical 
form of (1′) 
 (1′) x (Fx  y (Fy  x=y)  Gx) 
rather than G(x Fx). Thus Russell actually proposed the elimination of 
the descriptive operator ‘ ‘ understood as ‘the only’, and deprived defi-
nite descriptions of their self-contained meaning. Though Russell’s theo-
ry seems to be currently the dominant theory of definite descriptions, it 
has encountered its fair share of criticism.  
Apart from the fact that Russell’s translation of simple sentences like 
“The F is a G” into the molecular form “There is an F and at most one 
thing is an F and this thing is a G” is rather enigmatic, the criticism con-
cerns the contention that Russell simply got the truth conditions wrong 
in important cases of using descriptions when there is no such thing as 
the unique F.  
This criticism was triggered by Strawson who in (1950) objected that 
Russell’s theory predicts the wrong truth-conditions for sentences like 
‘The present King of France is bald’. According to Russell’s analysis, this 
sentence is false, but according to Strawson, this does not conform to our 
 
1  I am grateful to Pavel Materna for remarks and comments to this introductory section.  
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intuitions about its truth or falsity. In Strawson’s view, the sentence in a 
world at a time where there is no King of France can be neither true nor 
false. It is not true, obviously. However, if it were false then its negation 
“The King of France is not bald” would be true, which entails that there 
is a unique King of France, contrary to the assumption. Strawson vacil-
lated between two alternatives. Either the sentence has a truth-value 
gap, or it fails to express a determinate proposition. If there is no present 
King of France, then an utterance containing such an expression is 
somehow defective. Strawson held that sentences like these do not entail 
the existence of the present King of France, but rather presuppose his ex-
istence. If ‘the present King of France’ fails to refer, then the presupposi-
tion is false and the sentence fails to have a determinate truth value.2  
Russell (1957) in response to Strawson’s criticism argued that, despite 
Strawson’s protests, the sentence was in fact false:  
Suppose, for example, that in some country there was a law that no person 
could hold public office if he considered it false that the Ruler of the Universe 
is wise. I think an avowed atheist who took advantage of Mr. Strawson’s doc-
trine to say that he did not hold this proposition false would be regarded as a 
somewhat shifty character.  (Ludlow, 2007) 
Strawson himself in (1964) came to doubt whether the debate of en-
tailment versus presupposition could be settled by “brisk little formal 
argument[s]”.  
Donnellan (1966) observed that there is a sense in which Strawson 
and Russell are both right (and both wrong) about the proper analysis of 
definite descriptions, because definite descriptions can be used in (at 
least) two different ways. On a so-called attributive use, a sentence of the 
form ‘The F is a G’ is used to express a proposition equivalent to ‘What-
ever is uniquely F is G’. Alternatively, on a referential use, a sentence of 
the form ‘The F is a G’ is used to pick out a specific individual, a, and say 
of a that a is a G. Donnellan suggested that Russell’s quantificational 
account of definite descriptions might capture attributive uses, but that it 
does not work for referential uses. Ludlow in (2007) interprets Donnellan 
as arguing that in some cases descriptions are Russellian and in other 
cases they are Strawsonian. And he adds that “perhaps we could even 
say that the definite determiner ‘the’ is ambiguous between these two 
 
2  Nevertheless, for Strawson, sentences are meaningful in and of themselves, inde-
pendently of the empirical facts like contingent non-existence of the King of France.  
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cases (it is not clear whether Donnellan himself intended to endorse a 
lexical ambiguity of this sort)”. 
Kripke (1977) responded to Donnellan by arguing that the Russellian 
account of definite descriptions could, by itself, account for both referen-
tial and attributive uses, and that the difference between the two cases 
could be entirely a matter of pragmatics, because there is an important 
distinction between what one literally says by an utterance and what one 
intends to communicate by that utterance. 
However, Neale (1990) supported Russell’s view by collecting a num-
ber of previously observed cases in which intuitions about truth condi-
tions clearly do not support Strawson’s view. On the other hand, a num-
ber of linguists have recently come to Strawson’s defense on this matter. 
For a detailed survey of the arguments supporting Strawson’s view as 
well as Russell’s view, see Ludlow (2007). Here it might suffice to say that 
Strawson’s concerns have not delivered a knock-out blow to Russell’s 
theory of descriptions, and so this topic remains very much active. 
 In this paper I am not going to take into account Kripke’s pragmatic 
factors like the intentions of a speaker. In other words, I am not going to 
take into account what a speaker might have meant by his/her utterance, 
for this is irrelevant to a logical semantic theory. Instead, I will propose a 
literal semantic analysis of sentences of the form “The F is a G”. What I want 
to show is this. First, definite descriptions are not deprived of a self-
contained meaning and they denote one and the same entity in any con-
text. Thus they are never Russellian. Second, Russell was nevertheless 
right in his insight that a definite description ‘the F’ does not refer to a 
definite individual. Rather, it denotes a condition to be contingently satis-
fied by the individual (if any) that happens to be the F. I will explicate 
such conditions in terms of possible-world intensions, viz. as individual 
roles or offices to be occupied by exactly one individual per world/time 
pair. Third, I am going to show that Donnellan was right that sentences of 
the form “The F is a G” are ambiguous. However, their ambiguity does 
not concern a shift of meaning of the definite description ‘the F’. Rather, 
the ambiguity concerns different topic-focus articulations of these sentenc-
es. There are two options. Description ‘the F’ may occur in the topic of a 
sentence and some G (the focus) is predicated about the topic. This case 
corresponds to Donnellan’s referential use; using medieval terminology I 
will say that ‘the F’ occurs with de re supposition. The other option is ‘G’ 
occurring in the topic and ‘the F’ in the focus of the sentence. This reading 
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corresponds to Donnellan’s attributive use of ‘the F’ and the description 
occurs with de dicto supposition. Consequently, such sentences are ambig-
uous between their de dicto and de re readings. On their de re reading they 
presuppose the existence of a unique F. Thus Strawson’s analysis appears to 
be adequate for de re cases. On their de dicto reading they have the truth-
conditions as specified by Russellian analysis. They do not presuppose, 
but only entail, the existence of a unique F. However, the Russellian analy-
sis, though being equivalent to the one I am going to propose, is not an 
adequate literal analysis of de dicto readings, because it deprives the se-
mantically meaningful constituent ‘the F’ of its meaning.  
 There has been much dispute among theoretical linguists and logi-
cians over whether the problem of topic-focus articulation is a problem 
of semantics rather than pragmatics. In this paper I am going to demon-
strate the semantic nature of the topic-focus difference by means of a 
logical analysis. To this end I apply the procedural semantics of Transpar-
ent Intensional Logic (TIL) and assign (algorithmically structured) proce-
dures to expressions as their meanings. As a result, I will furnish sen-
tences differing only in the topic-focus articulation with different struc-
tured meanings producing different possible-world propositions.  
 I am also going to show that the proposed solution of the definite 
description problem generalizes to any sentences differing in their topic-
focus articulation. While the clause standing in the topic generates the 
case of a presupposition, a focus-clause usually entails rather than pre-
supposes another proposition. Thus I am going to introduce a general 
analytic schema of sentences that come with a presupposition. Since our 
logic is a hyperintensional logic of partial functions, I analyse sentences 
with presuppositions in a natural way. It means that I furnish them with 
hyperpropositions, viz. procedures that produce possible-world proposi-
tions with truth-value gaps. Having a rigorous, fine-grained analysis at 
our disposal, we can then easily infer relevant consequences.3 
 The paper is organised as follows.4 After briefly introducing the phi-
losophy of TIL and its basic notions in Section 2, the main Section 3 in-
 
3 For an introduction to the notion of hyperproposition, see Jespersen, B. ‘How hyper are 
 hyperpropositions?’, Language and Linguistics Compass, forthcoming. 
4  Some results of this paper are taken from the paper presented by the author at CICLing 
2009, Computational Linguistics and Intelligent Text Processing conference in Mexico City, 
see Duží (2009). 
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troduces the method of analysing sentences with presuppositions in-
duced by the topic of a sentence, and entailment triggered by a focus 
clause. The method is then applied to a de re and a de dicto reading, re-
spectively, of the analysed sentences of the form “The F is a G”. Finally, I 
generalise the method to sentences of any form. Section 4 concludes by 
indicating the direction of future research and a few notes on implemen-
tation of TIL via the TIL-Script functional programming language. 
2   A Brief Introduction to TIL 
 TIL is an overarching semantic theory for all sorts of discourse, 
whether colloquial, scientific, mathematical or logical.5 The semantic 
theory is a procedural one, according to which sense is an abstract, pre-
linguistic procedure detailing what operations to apply to what proce-
dural constituents to arrive at the product (if any) of the procedure. Such 
procedures are rigorously defined as TIL constructions. The semantics is 
tailored to the hardest case, as constituted by hyperintensional contexts, 
and generalized from there to simpler intensional and extensional con-
texts. This entirely anti-contextual and compositional semantics is, to the 
best of my knowledge, the only one that deals with all kinds of context 
in a uniform way.  Thus the sense of a sentence is an algorithmically 
structured construction of the proposition denoted by the sentence. The 
denoted proposition is a flat, or unstructured, mapping with domain in a 
logical space of possible worlds. Our motive for working ‘top-down’ has 
to do with anti-contextualism: any given unambiguous term or expres-
sion (even one involving indexicals or anaphoric pronouns) expresses 
the same construction as its sense whatever sort of context the term or 
expression is embedded within. And the meaning of an expression de-
termines the respective denoted entity (if any), but not vice versa. The 
denoted entities are (possibly 0-ary) functions understood as set-
theoretical mappings. Thus we strictly distinguish between a procedure 
(construction) and its product (here, a constructed function), and be-
tween a function and its value.  
 Intuitively, construction C is a procedure (a generalised algorithm). 
Constructions are structured in the following way. Each construction C 
 
5  For details, see, for instance, Duží – Jespersen – Materna (forthcoming), Materna (2004), 
Tichý (1988) and Tichý (2004).  
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consists of sub-instructions (constituents), each of which needs to be 
executed when executing C. Thus a specification of a construction is a 
specification of an instruction on how to proceed in order to obtain the 
output entity given some input entities.6  
 There are two kinds of constructions, atomic and compound (molecu-
lar). Atomic constructions (Variables and Trivializations) do not contain 
any other constituent but themselves; they specify objects (of any type) 
on which compound constructions operate. The variables x, y, p, q, …, 
construct objects dependently on a valuation; they v-construct. The Trivi-
alisation of an object X (of any type, even a construction), in symbols 0X, 
constructs simply X without the mediation of any other construction. 
Compound constructions, which consist of other constituents as well, are 
Composition and Closure. The Composition [F A1…An] is the operation of 
functional application. It v-constructs the value of the function f (valua-
tion-, or v-, -constructed by F) at a tuple argument A (v-constructed by 
A1, …, An), if the function f is defined at A, otherwise the Composition is 
v-improper, i.e., it fails to v-construct anything.7 The Closure [x1…xn X] 
spells out the instruction to v-construct a function by abstracting over 
the values of the variables x1,…,xn in the ordinary manner of the -
calculi. Finally, higher-order constructions can be used twice over as 
constituents of composite constructions. This is achieved by a fifth 
construction called Double Execution, 2X, that behaves as follows: If X v-
constructs a construction X’, and X’ v-constructs an entity Y, then 2X v-
constructs Y; otherwise 2X is v-improper, failing as it does to v-construct 
anything.  
 TIL constructions, as well as the entities they construct, all receive a 
type. The formal ontology of TIL is bi-dimensional; one dimension is 
made up of constructions, the other dimension encompasses non-
constructions. On the ground level of the type hierarchy, there are non-
constructional entities unstructured from the algorithmic point of view 
belonging to a type of order 1. Given a so-called epistemic (or objectual) base 
of atomic types (-truth values, -individuals, -time moments/real num-
bers, -possible worlds), the induction rule for forming functional types 
is applied: where , 1,…,n are types of order 1, the set of partial map-
 
6  See also Duží et al. (2009). 
7  As mentioned above, we treat functions as partial mappings, i.e., set-theoretical objects, 
 unlike the constructions of functions.  
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pings from 1 … n to , denoted ‘( 1…n)’, is a type of order 1 as 
well.8 Constructions that construct entities of order 1 are constructions of 
order 1. They belong to a type of order 2, denoted ‘*1’. The type *1 togeth-
er with atomic types of order 1 serves as a base for the induction rule: 
any collection of partial mappings, type ( 1…n), involving *1 in their 
domain or range is a type of order 2. Constructions belonging to a type *2 
that identify entities of order 1 or 2, and partial mappings involving 
such constructions, belong to a type of order 3. And so on ad infinitum.  
 The sense of an empirical expression is a hyperintension, i.e., a con-
struction that produces a (possible world) (-)intension, where -
intensions are members of type (), i.e., functions from possible worlds 
to an arbitrary type . On the other hand, (-)extensions are members of a 
type , where  is not equal to () for any , i.e., extensions are not 
functions whose domain are possible worlds.  
 Intensions are frequently functions of a type (()), i.e., functions 
from possible worlds to chronologies of the type  (in symbols: ), 
where a chronology is a function of type ().  
 Some important kinds of intensions are:  
 Propositions, type . They are denoted by empirical sentences.  
 Properties of members of a type , or simply -properties, type ().9 
General terms, some substantives, intransitive verbs (‘student’, 
‘walks’) denote properties, mostly of individuals. 
 Relations-in-intension, type (1…m). For example transitive empiri-
cal verbs (‘like’, ‘worship’), also attitudinal verbs denote these rela-
tions.  
 -roles, also -offices, type , where  ≠ (). Frequently . Often 
denoted by concatenation of a superlative and a noun (‘the highest 
mountain’).  
 
8  TIL is an open-ended system. The above epistemic base {, , , } was chosen, because 
it is apt for natural-language analysis, but the choice of base depends on the area to be 
analysed. For instance, possible worlds and times are out of place in case of mathemat-
ics, and the base might consist of, e.g.,  and , where  is the type of natural numbers.  
9  We model -sets and (1…n)-relations by their characteristic functions of type (), 
(1…n), respectively. Thus an -property is an empirical function that dependently 
on states-of-affairs () picks-up a set of -individuals, the population of the property.  
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An object A of a type  is denoted ‘A/‘. That a construction C/n v-
constructs an object of type  is denoted ‘C v ‘. We use variables w, 
w1, … as v-constructing elements of type  (possible worlds), and t, t1, … 
as v-constructing elements of type  (times). If C v  v-constructs an 
-intension, the frequently used Composition of the form [[Cw]t], the 
intensional descent of the -intension, is abbreviated ‘Cwt’.  
 We invariably furnish expressions with their procedural structured 
meanings, which are explicated as TIL constructions. The analysis of a 
sentence thus consists in discovering the logical construction encoded by 
a given sentence. The TIL method of analysis consists of three steps:10 
 1) Type-theoretical analysis, i.e., assigning types to the objects that re-
ceive mention in the analysed sentence.  
 2) Synthesis, i.e., combining the constructions of the objects ad (1) in 
order to construct the proposition of type  denoted by the 
whole sentence.  
 3) Type-Theoretical checking. 
To illustrate the method, let us first analyse the sentence “The King 
of France is watching TV” in the Strawsonian way. The sentence talks 
about the office of the King of France (topic) ascribing to the individual 
(if any) that occupies this office the property of watching TV (focus). 
Thus there is a presupposition that the King of France exist, i.e., that 
the office be occupied. If not, then the proposition denoted by the sen-
tence has no truth-value.11 This fact has to be revealed by our analysis. 
Here is how.  
 Ad (1). King_of/(): an empirical function that dependently on 
world/time w, t-pairs assigns to an individual another individual (its 
king); France/; King_of_France/; Watch/(): the property of watch-
ing TV.12  
 
10  For details see, e.g., Materna – Duží (2005). 
11  On our approach this does not mean that the sentence is meaningless. The sentence has 
 a sense, namely an instruction of how to evaluate in any possible world w at any time t 
 its truth-conditions. Only if we evaluate these conditions in such a state-of-affairs 
 where there is no King of France does the process of evaluation yield a truth-value gap.  
12 For the sake of simplicity I will analyse the predicate ‘watching TV’ as a semantically 
 simple expression denoting the property Watch. To obtain a more detailed analysis, the 
 property would be constructed by the Closure wt x [0Watchingwt x 0TV], where x  
 , TV/, Watching/(). 
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 Ad (2). Now we combine constructions of the objects ad (1) in order 
to construct the proposition (of type ) denoted by the whole sen-
tence. Since we aim at discovering the literal analysis of the sentence, 
objects denoted by semantically simple expressions ‘the king of’, 
‘France’ and ‘watching TV’ are constructed by their Trivialisations: 
0King_of, 0France, 0Watch. In order to construct the office King_of_France, 
we have to combine 0King_of and 0France. The function King_of must be 
extensionalised first via the Composition 0King_ofwt, and the result is 
then applied to France; we get [0King_ofwt 0France] v . Abstracting over 
the values of w and t we obtain the Closure that constructs the office: 
wt [0King_ofwt 0France]  . But the property of watching TV cannot 
be ascribed to an individual office. Rather, it is ascribed to the individ-
ual (if any) occupying the office. Thus the office has to be subjected to 
intensional descent first: wt [0King_ofwt 0France]wt  . The property 
itself has to be extensionalised as well, namely thus: 0Watchwt. By Com-
posing these two constructions, we obtain either a truth-value (T or F) 
or nothing, according as the King of France is or is not watching TV, or 
does not exist, respectively.13 Finally, by abstracting over the values of 
the variables w and t, we construct the proposition: 
 wt [0Watchwt wt [0King_ofwt 0France]wt]. 
This Closure can be equivalently -reduced to  
 wt [0Watchwt [0King_ofwt 0France]]. 
Gloss. In any world at any time (wt) do this: First, find out who is the 
King of France by applying the extensionalised attribute King_of to 
France ([0King_ofwt 0France]). If there is none, then terminate with a 
truth-value gap because the Composition [0King_ofwt 0France] is v-
improper. Otherwise, check whether the so obtained individual has the 
property of watching TV ([0Watchwt [0King_ofwt 0France]]). If so, then T, 
otherwise F.  
 Ad (3). By drawing a type-theoretical structural tree,14 we check 
whether the particular constituents of the above Closure are combined in 
a type-theoretically correct way.  
 
13  For details on predication of properties see Jespersen (2008).  
14  See Duží – Materna (2005).  
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w t [[[0Watch w] t]  [[ [0King_of  w] t] 0France]] 
   
      ((()))    ((()))      
 
  (())     (()) 
 
()      () 
 
              
 
     ()             
  
(())   the type of a proposition,  for short.  
So much for the method of analysis and the semantic schema of the logic 
of TIL.  
3   The Topic-Focus Ambiguity  
 Now we are going to apply the formal TIL apparatus in order to pro-
pose a solution to the Strawsonian-Russellian dilemma. In other words, 
we are going to analyse the phenomena of presupposition and entailment 
connected with using definite descriptions, and I will show how the topic-
focus distinction determines which of the two phenomena is the case. 
 When used in a communicative act, a sentence communicates some-
thing (the focus F) about something (the topic T). Thus the schematic 
structure of a sentence is F(T). The topic T of a sentence S is often associ-
ated with a presupposition P of S such that P is entailed both by S and 
non-S. On the other hand, the clause in the focus usually triggers a mere 
entailment of some P by S. Schematically,  
 (i)  S╞ P and non-S╞ P   (P is a presupposition of S); 
   Corollary: If non-P then neither S nor non-S is true.  
 (ii)  S╞ P and neither (non-S╞ P) nor (non-S╞ non-P)  (mere entailment). 
 More precisely, the entailment relation obtains between hyperpropo-
sitions P, S, i.e., the meaning of P is entailed or presupposed by the 
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meaning of S. For the precise definition of entailment and presupposi-
tion, see Duží et al. (forthcoming, Section 1.5). 
 To give an example, consider the sentence “Our defeat was caused by 
John”.15 There are two possible readings of this sentence. Either the sen-
tence is about our defeat, conveying the snippet of information that it 
was caused by John. In such a situation the sentence is associated with 
the presupposition that we were defeated. Indeed, the negated form of 
the sentence, “Our defeat was not caused by John”, also implies that we 
were defeated. Thus ‘our defeat’ is the topic and ‘was caused by John’ 
the focus clause. On the other possible reading, the sentence is about the 
topic John, ascribing to him the property that he caused our defeat (fo-
cus). Now the scenario of truly asserting the negated sentence can be, for 
instance, the following. Though it is true that John has the reputation of 
being rather a bad player, Paul was in excellent shape and so we won. 
Or, another scenario is thinkable. We were defeated, only not because of 
John but because the whole team performed badly. Hence, that we were 
defeated is not presupposed by this reading, it is only entailed.  
 Since there are no rigorous grammatical rules to distinguish between 
the two variants, the input of our logical analysis is the result of a linguis-
tic analysis, where the topic and focus of a sentence are made explicit.16 
In this paper I will mark the topic clause in italics. Thus the two readings 
of the above sentence are “Our defeat was caused by John” and “Our 
defeat was caused by John”.17   
3.1 The Strawsonian vs. Russellian analysis 
 Above we analysed the sentence “The King of France is watching 
TV” on its perhaps most natural reading as predicating the property of 
watching TV (the focus) of the individual (if any) that is the present King 
of France (the topic).  
 
15  This and some other examples were taken from Hajičová (2008). 
16 For instance, the Prague linguistic school created The Prague Dependency Treebank 
for the Czech language, which contains a large amount of Czech texts with complex 
and interlink annotation on different levels. The tectogrammatical representation con-
tains the logical structure of a sentence with topic-focus annotators. For details, see 
http://ufal.mff.cuni.cz/pdt2.0/.  
17  True, in this case we would most probably use the active form “John caused our de-
feat”. 
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 Yet there is another, albeit less natural reading of the sentence. Im-
agine that the sentence is uttered in a situation where somebody asks 
“What about TV?”, and the answer is “Well, among those who are 
watching TV there is the King of France”. If you got such an answer, 
you would most probably protest, “This cannot be true, for there is no 
King of France now”. On such a reading the sentence is about TV, as-
cribing to it the property of being watched by the King of France. Thus 
we have: 
Strawsonian reading:   “The King of France is watching TV” 
Russellian reading:   “The King of France is watching TV”,  
or perhaps a more natural passive rephrasing: 
        “TV is being watched by the King of France”. 
The analysis of the former is as above: 
 (S)  wt [0Watchwt wt [0King_ofwt 0France]wt]  
The meaning of ‘the King of France’, viz. wt [0King_ofwt 0France], occurs 
in (S) with de re supposition, because the object of predication is the 
unique value of the office, not the office itself.18 The two de re principles 
are, thus, valid. They are the principle of existential presupposition and the 
principle of substitution of co-referential expressions. Thus the following 
arguments are valid (though not sound): 
 “The King of France is/is not watching TV” 
 ――――――――――――――――――――――――― 
 “The King of France exists” 
 “The King of France is watching TV” 
 “The King of France is Louis XVI” 
 ――――――――――――――――――――― 
 “Louis XVI is watching TV” 
Here are the proofs.19 
 
18  For details on de dicto vs. de re supposition, see Duží et al., forthcoming, in particular 
Sections 1.5.2 and 2.6.2, and also Duží (2004). 
19 For an easier reading, throughout this paper I use infix notation without Trivialization 
 when applying truth-value connectives and equality. Thus, for instance, instead of ‘[0 
 [0= [05 05]] [0= [n 01]]]’ I will write ‘[[05=05]  [n=01]]’. 
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(a)  existential presupposition: 
First, existence is here a property of an individual office rather than of 
some non-existing individual, whatever that would mean. Thus we have 
Exist/(). To prove the validity of the first argument, we define Ex-
ist/() as the property of an office’s being occupied in a given 
world/time pair:  
 0Exist =of wt c [0x [x = cwt]], i.e., [0Existwt c] =o [0x [x =i cwt]] 
Types: /(()): the class of non-empty classes of individuals; c v ; x 
v ; =o/(): the identity of truth-values; =of/(()()): the 
identity of individual-office properties.  
 Let =i/() be the identity of individuals, x  , Louis/, Empty/ 
(()) the singleton containing the empty set of individuals and Improp-
er/(1) the property of constructions of being v-improper in a given 
w, t-pair, the other types as above. Then in any w, t the following 
proof steps are truth-preserving:  
 1) [0Watchwt wt [0King_ofwt 0France]wt] assumption 
 2) [0Improperwt 0[[wt [0King_ofwt 0France]]wt]] 
by definition of Composition 
 3) [0Empty x [x =i [wt [0King_ofwt 0France]]wt]]  obvious from (2) 
 4) [0x [x =i [wt [0King_ofwt 0France]]wt]] existential generalization 
 5) [0Existwt [wt [0King_ofwt 0France]]]  by def. of Exist. 
The proof from [0Watchwt wt [0King_ofwt 0France]wt] is analogous. 
(b)  substitution: 
 1) [0Watchwt wt [0King_ofwt 0France]wt] assumption 
 2) [0Louis =i wt [0King_ofwt 0France]wt] assumption 
 3) [0Watchwt 0Louis] substitution of identicals 
On the other reading, the sentence is not associated with the presupposi-
tion that the present King of France exist, because ‘the King of France’ 
occurs now in the focus clause. The truth-conditions of the Russellian 
“TV is being watched by the King of France” are these: 
 True, if TV is being watched by the King of France 
 False, if among those who are watching TV there is no King of France 
(either because the present King of France does not exist or because 
the King of France is busy with some other activity). 
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 Thus the two readings have different truth-conditions, and they are 
not equivalent, albeit they are co-entailing. The reason is this. Trivially, a 
valid argument is truth-preserving from premises to conclusion. However, 
due to partiality, the entailment relation may fail to be falsity-preserving 
from conclusion to premises. As a consequence, if A, B are constructions of 
propositions such that A╞ B and B╞ A, then A, B are not necessarily 
equivalent in the sense of constructing the same proposition. The propo-
sitions they construct may not be identical, though they take the truth-
value T at exactly the same world/times, because they may differ in 
such a way that in some w, t-pair(s) one takes the value F while the 
other is undefined.  
 Russellian vs. Strawsonian analysis is an example of such co-entailing 
yet non-equivalent hyperpropositions. The Russellian rephrasing of the 
sentence  
 (S1)  “The King of France is watching TV” 
would be sentence S2:  
(S2)  “There is a unique individual such that he is the King of France 
and he is watching TV.” 
The TIL analyses of these two sentences come down to these Closures: 20  
 (S1’) wt [0Watchwt wt [0King_ofwt 0France]wt]  
 (S2’) wt [0x [x = [wt [0King_ofwt 0France]wt]  [0Watchwt x]]].  
 Now (S1’)╞ (S2’) and (S2’)╞ (S1’), but the two are not equivalent. If the 
proposition constructed by (S1’) is true then so is the proposition con-
structed by (S2’), and vice versa. But, for instance, in the actual world now  
the proposition constructed by (S1’) has no truth-value whereas the propo-
sition constructed by (S2’) is simply false. This proposition is false if either 
the King of France does not exist, or he is not watching TV. Moreover, the 
TIL analysis of the ‘Russellian rephrasing’ does not deprive ‘the King of 
France’ of its meaning. The meaning is invariably, in all contexts, the Clo-
sure wt [0King_ofwt 0France].  
 
20  Note that it is not necessary to explicitly specify the uniqueness of the King of France, 
 as it is given by the meaning of the expression ‘the King of France’, and thus by the 
 type of the denoted entity, viz. .  
DSpace VŠB-TUO http://hdl.handle.net/10084/77762 30/11/2012
602  ______________________________________________________________  Marie Duží 
 Thus we might be content with (S2’) and assign this construction to 
the sentence 
 (R)  “TV is being watched by the King of France”  
as its meaning. Yet we should not be content with (S2’). The reason is 
this. Besides depriving the definite description ‘the King of France’ of its 
self-contained meaning, Russell’s analysis has another defect. The exis-
tential quantifier  and conjunction  do not receive mention in the sen-
tence (R). Thus assigning (S2’) to (R) as its meaning does not comply with 
Carnap’s principle of subject matter, which says, roughly, that only those 
entities that receive mention in the sentence can become constituents of 
its meaning.21 In other words, the sentence (S2), though sharing its truth-
conditions with (R), is too loose a reformulation of the original sentence.  
 However, the remedy is easy. From the logical point of view, the two 
readings differ in the way their respective negated form is obtained. 
Whereas the Strawsonian negated form is “The King of France is not 
watching TV”, which obviously lacks a truth-value if the King of France 
does not exist, the Russellian negated form is simply “It is not true that 
the King of France is watching TV”, which is true in those w, t-pairs 
were the office is not occupied. Thus in the Strawsonian case the proper-
ty of not watching TV is ascribed to the individual, if any, that occupies 
the King’s office. The meaning of ‘the King of France’ occurs with de re 
supposition, as we have seen above. On the other hand, in the Russellian 
case the property of not being true is ascribed to the whole proposition 
that the King is watching TV, and thus (the same meaning of) the de-
scription ‘the King of France’ occurs with de dicto supposition. And it is a 
brute fact that de re and de dicto readings are not equivalent in general, in 
particular when partiality is involved.22  
 Russell argued for his theory in (1905, p. 3), saying: 
The evidence for the above theory is derived from the difficulties which seem 
unavoidable if we regard denoting phrases as standing for genuine constitu-
ents of the propositions in whose verbal expressions they occur. Of the possi-
ble theories which admit such constituents the simplest is that of Meinong. 
This theory regards any grammatically correct denoting phrase as standing 
for an object. Thus ‘the present King of France’, ‘the round square’, etc., are 
 
21  See Carnap (1947, §24.2, §26).  
22  See Duží (2004). 
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supposed to be genuine objects. It is admitted that such objects do not subsist, 
but nevertheless they are supposed to be objects. This is in itself a difficult 
view; but the chief objection is that such objects, admittedly, are apt to in-
fringe the law of contradiction. It is contended, for example, that the existent 
present King of France exists, and also does not exist; that the round square is 
round, and also not round, etc. But this is intolerable; and if any theory can 
be found to avoid this result, it is surely to be preferred. 
Russell did avoid the intolerable result that the King of France both does 
and does not exist, but the price he paid is too high. TIL, as a hyperinten-
sional, typed partial -calculus, is in a much better position to solve the 
problem. We simply ascribe the property of being true to the whole 
proposition.  
 To do so we use the propositional property True/(), which re-
turns T for those w, t-pairs at which the argument proposition is true, 
and F in all the remaining cases. There are two other propositional prop-
erties False, and Undef, all of type (). The three properties are de-
fined as follows. Let P be a propositional construction (P/n  ). Then  
 [0Truewt P] v-constructs the truth-value T iff 
Pwt v-constructs T, otherwise F. 
 [0Falsewt P] v-constructs the truth-value T iff 
[Pwt] v-constructs T, otherwise F. 
 [0Undefwt P] v-constructs the truth-value T iff  
[[0Truewt P]  [0Falsewt P]] v-constructs T, otherwise F.  
Thus we have: 
 [0Undefwt P] = [[0Truewt P]  [0Falsewt P]] 
 [0Truewt P] = [[0Falsewt P]  [0Undefwt P]] 
 [0Falsewt P] = [[0Truewt P]  [0Undefwt P]] 
Hence, though we work with truth-value gaps, we do not work with a 
third truth-value, and our logic is in this weak sense bivalent.  
 Now the analysis of the sentence (R) comes down to this construc-
tion: 
 (R’) wt [0Truewt wt [0Watchwt wt [0King_ofwt 0France]wt]] 
Neither (R’) nor its negation  
 (R’_neg)  wt [0Truewt wt [0Watchwt wt [0King_ofwt 0France]wt]] 
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entails that the King of France exists, which is just as it should be. 
(R’_neg) constructs the proposition non-P that takes the truth-value T if 
the proposition that the King of France is watching TV takes the value F 
(because the King of France is not watching TV) or is undefined (because 
the King of France does not exist). 
 Consider now another group of sample sentences:  
 (2)  The King of France visited London yesterday. 
 (2’) The King of France did not visit London yesterday.  
 The sentences (2) and (2’) talk about the (actual and current) King of 
France (the topic), ascribing to him the property of having (not having) 
visited London yesterday (the focus). Thus both sentences share the pre-
supposition that the King of France actually exist now. If this presupposi-
tion fails to be satisfied, then none of the propositions expressed by (2) 
and (2’) has a truth-value. The situation is different in case of sentences 
(3) and (3’): 
 (3)  London was visited by the King of France yesterday.  
 (3’)  London was not visited by the King of France yesterday. 
Now the property (the focus) of having been visited by the King of 
France yesterday is predicated of London (the topic). The existence of the 
King of France (now) is not presupposed by (3), and thus also not by (3’), 
of course. The sentences can be read as “Among the visitors of London 
yesterday was (was not) the King of France”. The existence of the King 
of France yesterday is entailed only by (3), but not presupposed.  
 Our analyses respect these conditions. Let Yesterday/(()) be the 
function that associates a given time t with the time interval that is yes-
terday with respect to t; Visit/(); King_of/(); France/; 
/(()): 
the existential quantifier that assigns to a given set of times the truth-
value T if the set is non-empty, otherwise F. In what follows I will use an 
abbreviated notation without Trivialisation, writing ‘x A’ instead of 
‘[0x A]’, when no confusion can arise.  
 The analyses of sentences (2), (2’) come down to  
 (2*) wt [x t’[[[0Yesterday t] t’]  
[0Visitwt’ x 0London]] [0King_ofwt 0France]] 
 (2’*)  wt [x [t’[[[0Yesterday t] t’]  
[0Visitwt’ x 0London]] [0King_ofwt 0France]] 
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In such a w, t-pair at which the King of France does not exist both the 
propositions constructed by (2*) and (2’*) have no truth-value, because 
the Composition [0King_ofwt 0France] is v-improper. We have the Straw-
sonian case, the meaning of ‘King of France’ occurring with de re suppo-
sition, and the King’s existence being presupposed. 
On the other hand, the sentences (3), (3’) express  
 (3*) wt t’[[[0Yesterday t] t’]   
[0Visitwt’ [0King_ofwt’ 0France] 0London]] 
 (3’*) wt t’[[[0Yesterday t] t’]   
[0Visitwt’ [0King_ofwt’ 0France] 0London]] 
Now at such a w, t-pair at which the proposition constructed by (3*) is 
true, the Composition t’[[[0Yesterday t] t’]  [0Visitwt’ [0King_ofwt’ 0France] 
0London]] v-constructs the truth-value T. This means that the second con-
junct v-constructs T as well and the Composition [0King_ofwt’ 0France] is 
not v-improper. Thus the King of France existed at some time t’ belonging 
to yesterday. On the other hand, if the King of France did not exist at any 
time yesterday, then the Composition [0King_ofwt’ 0France] is v-improper 
for any t’ belonging to yesterday. Thus the time interval v-constructed by 
t’[[[0Yesterday t] t’]  [0Visitwt’ [0King_ofwt’ 0France] 0London]], as well as by 
t’[[[0Yesterday t] t’]  [0Visitwt’ [0King_ofwt’ 0France] 0London]], is empty, 
and the existential quantifier takes this interval to the truth-value F. This 
is as it should be, because (3*) only implies the existence of the King of 
France yesterday but does not presuppose it. We have the Russellian case. 
The meaning of the definite description ‘the King of France’ occurs with 
de dicto supposition in (3) and (3’).23 The King’s existence is not presup-
posed by (3) or (3’), only entailed by (3).  
 3.2 General analytic schema  
 Up until now we have utilised the singularity of the office of King of 
France, which is a function of type . If the King of France does not 
exist in some world W at some time T, the office is not occupied and the 
function does not have a value in W at T. Due to the partiality of the 
office constructed by wt [0King_ofwt 0France] and the principle of com-
 
23  More precisely, the meaning of ‘the King of France’ occurs with de dicto supposition 
 with respect to the temporal parameter t.  
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positionality, the respective analyses construct purely partial proposi-
tions associated with some presupposition, as desired.  
 However, we encounter the phenomenon of topic-focus and the asso-
ciated de dicto – de re ambivalence also in sentences containing general 
terms. Consider now another pair of sentences differing only in terms of 
topic-focus articulation:  
 (4)  The global financial and economic crisis was caused by the Bank 
   of America. 
 (5)  The Bank of America caused the global financial and economic 
   crisis. 
While (4) not only entails but also presupposes that there be a global 
financial and economic crisis, the truth-conditions of (5) are different, as 
our analysis clarifies. 
 First, (4) as well as (4’),  
 (4’) The global financial and economic crisis was not caused by Bank 
   of America. 
are about the global crisis, and that there is a global financial and eco-
nomic crisis is not only entailed but also presupposed by both the sen-
tences.  
 As we have seen above, the meaning of a sentence is a procedure 
producing a proposition, i.e. an object of type . Execution of this pro-
cedure in any world/time yields a truth-value T, F or nothing. Thus we 
can conceive the sense of a sentence as an instruction on how to evaluate 
its truth-conditions in any world/time. The instruction encoded by (4) 
formulated in logician’s English is this:  
If there is a global crisis then return T or F according as the crisis 
was caused by the Bank of America, else fail (to produce a truth-
value). 
 Since every TIL analysis is fully compositional, we first need to ana-
lyse particular constituents of this instruction, and then combine these 
constituents into the construction expressed by the sentence. As always, 
we start with assigning types to the objects that receive mention in the 
sentence. Simplifying a bit, let the objects be: 
 Crisis/: the proposition that there is a global financial and econom-
ic crisis;  
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 Cause/(): the relation-in-intension between an individual and a 
proposition which has been caused to be true by the individual;  
 Bank_of_America/: the individual office occupiable by a corporation 
belonging to the American financial institutions. 
 A schematic analysis of (4) comes down to this procedure: 
 (4s) wt [if 0Crisiswt then [0Truewt wt [0Causewt 0Bank_of_Americawt 
0Crisis]] else Fail] 
 Here we again use the propositional property True in the then-clause, 
because this clause occurs in the focus of the sentence, and thus with de 
dicto supposition. The existence of the Bank of America is not presup-
posed.  
 So far so good; yet there is a problem of how to analyse the connec-
tive if-then-else. There has been much dispute over the semantics of ‘if-
then-else’ among computer scientists. We cannot simply apply material 
implication, . For instance, it might seem that the instruction expressed 
by “If 5=5 then output 1, else output the result of 1 divided by 0” re-
ceived the analysis  
 [[[05=05]  [n=01]]  [[05=05]  [n=[0Div 01 00]]]], 
where n is the output number. But the output of the above procedure 
should be the number 1 because the else clause is never executed. How-
ever, due to the strict principle of compositionality that TIL observes, the 
above analysis fails to produce anything, the construction being improp-
er. The reason is this. The Composition [0Div 01 00] does not produce 
anything: it is improper because the division function takes no value at 
the argument <1, 0>. Thus the Composition [n = [0Div 01 00]] is v-
improper for any valuation v, because the identity relation = does not 
receive an argument, and so any other Composition containing the im-
proper Composition [0Div 01 00] as a constituent also comes out v-
improper. The underlying principle is that partiality is being strictly 
propagated up. This is the reason why the if-then-else connective is often 
said to be a non-strict function.  
 However, there is no cogent reason to settle for non-strictness. I sug-
gest applying a mechanism known in computer science as lazy evaluation. 
The procedural semantics of TIL operates smoothly even at the level of 
constructions. Thus it enables us to specify a strict definition of if-then-
else that meets the compositionality constraint. The analysis of “If P then 
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C1, else C2” is a procedure that decomposes into two phases. First, on the 
basis of the condition P, select one of C1, C2 as the procedure to be exe-
cuted. Second, execute the selected procedure.  
 The first phase, viz. the selection, is realized by the Composition  
 [0 c [[P  [c=0C]]  [P  [c=0D]]]]. 
 The Composition [[P  [c=0C]]  [P  [c=0D]]] v-constructs T in two 
cases. If P v-constructs T then the variable c receives as its value the con-
struction C, and if P v-constructs F then the variable c receives the con-
struction D as its value. In either case the set v-constructed by c [[P  
[c=0C]]  [P  [c=0D]]] is a singleton. Applying the singulariser  to this 
set returns as its value the only member of the set, i.e., either the con-
struction C or D.  
 Second, the chosen construction c is executed. As a result, the sche-
matic analysis of “If P then C else D” turns out to be 
 (*)  2[0 c [[P  [c=0C]]  [P  [c=0D]]]]. 
Types: P (the condition of the choice between the execution of C or 
D); C, D/n; variable c v n; /(n(n)): the singulariser function that 
associates a singleton set of constructions with the only construction that 
is an element of this singleton, and which is otherwise (i.e., if the set is 
empty or many-valued) undefined.  
 Note that we do need a hyperintensional, procedural semantics here. 
First of all, we need a variable c ranging over constructions. Moreover, 
the evaluation of the first phase does not involve the execution of the 
constructions C and D. These constructions are only arguments of other 
constructions.  
 Returning to the analysis of (4), in our case the condition P is that 
there be a crisis, i.e., 0Crisiswt. The construction C that is to be executed if 
P yields T is [0Truewt wt [0Causewt 0Bank_of_Americawt 0Crisis]], and if P 
yields F then no construction is to be selected. Thus the analysis of the 
sentence (4) comes down to this Closure:  
 (4*)  wt 2[0c [[0Crisiswt  [c = 0[0Truewt wt [0Causewt   
0Bank_of_Americawt  0Crisis]]]]  [0Crisiswt  0F]]] 
The evaluation of (4*) in any world/time pair w, t depends on whether 
the presupposition 0Crisiswt is true in w, t. If true, then the singleton v-
constructed by c [ … ] contains as the only construction the Composi-
DSpace VŠB-TUO http://hdl.handle.net/10084/77762 30/11/2012
Strawsonian vs. Russellian Definite Descriptions  _______________________________  609 
tion [0Truewt wt [0Causewt 0Bank_of_Americawt 0Crisis]], which is after-
wards executed to returns T or F, according as the Bank of America 
caused the crisis. If false, then the second conjunct in c […] comes down 
to [0T  0F] and thus we get c 0F. The v-constructed set is empty. Hence, 
2[c 0F] is v-improper, that is the Double Execution fails to produce a 
truth-value.  
 To generalise, an analytic schema of an (empirical) sentence S associated 
with a presupposition P is a procedure of the form  
 If P then S else Fail. 
The corresponding schematic TIL construction is  
 (**) wt 2[0c [[Pwt  [c=0Swt]]  [Pwt  0F]]].  
The truth-conditions of the other reading, i.e. the reading of (5) 
 (5)  “The Bank of America caused the global financial and economic 
crisis” 
are different.  
Now the sentence (5) is about the Bank of America (topic), ascribing 
to this corporation the property that it caused the crisis (focus). Thus the 
scenario of truly asserting that (5) is not true can be, for instance, this. 
Though it is true that the Bank of America played a major role in risky 
investments in China, the President of USA played a positive role in 
enhancing financial market transparency and passed new laws that pre-
vented a global crisis from arising. Or, a less optimistic scenario is think-
able. The global financial and economic crisis is not because of the Bank 
of America’s bad investments but because in the era of globalisation the 
market economy is unpredictable, hence uncontrollable.  
 Hence, that there is a crisis is not presupposed by (5), and its analysis 
is this Closure: 
 (5*) wt [0Causewt 0Bank_of_Americawt 0Crisis] 
Note that since the meaning of ‘Bank of America’ occurs with de re sup-
position now, (5) presupposes the existence of the Bank of America, 
while the existence of the crisis is not presupposed. Yet, if (5) is true, 
then the existence of the crisis can be validly inferred. To capture such 
truth-conditions, we need to refine the analysis.  
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A plausible explication of this phenomenon is this: x is a cause of a 
proposition p iff p is true and if so then x affected p so that to become 
true. Schematically,  
wt [0Causewt x p] = wt [pwt  [pwt  [0Affectwt x p]]]. 
Types: Cause, Affect/(); x  , : any type; p  . 
If x is not a cause of p, then either p is not true or p is true but x did 
not affect p such as to become true:  
wt [0Causewt x p] = wt [pwt  [pwt  [0Affectwt x p]]]. 
Applying such an explication to (5), we get 
 (5**) wt [0Crisiswt  [0Crisiswt  [0Affectwt 0Bank_of_Americawt 0Crisis]]], 
entailing that there is a crisis, which is the desired (logical, though not 
economic) outcome.  
 A similar phenomenon also crops up in the case of seeking and find-
ing. Imagine one is referring to the tragedy in Dallas, November 22, 
1963, by “The police were seeking the murderer of JFK but never found 
him”. The sentence is again ambiguous due to a difference in topic-focus 
articulation, as evidenced by (6) and (7):  
 (6) The police were seeking the murderer of JFK but never found 
him. 
 (7) The police were seeking the murderer of JFK but never found 
him. 
 The existence of the murderer of JFK is not presupposed by (6), un-
like (7). The sentence (6) can be true in such states-of-affairs where JFK 
was not murdered, unlike the sentence (7). The latter can be reformulat-
ed in a less ambiguous way as “The murderer of JFK was looked for by the 
police but never found”. This sentence expresses the construction  
 (7*) wt [[0Look_forwt 0Police [wt [0Murderer_ofwt 0JFK]]wt]  
[0FindLwt 0Police [wt [0Murderer_ofwt 0JFK]]wt]]. 
Types: Look_for, FindL/(); Police/; Murderer_of/(); JFK/.24  
 
24  For the sake of simplicity, past tense and anaphoric reference are ignored. For a more 
 detailed analysis of this kind of seeking and finding, see, for instance, Duží (2008) or 
 Duží et al., forthcoming, Chapter 5.  
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On the other hand, the analysis of (6) relates the police to the office of 
the murderer rather than to its holder. The police primarily aim to find 
out who the murderer is. Thus we have Seek, FindS/(); and (6) ex-
presses: 
 (6*) wt [[0Seekwt 0Police [wt [0Murderer_ofwt 0JFK]]]  
[0FindSwt 0Police [wt [0Murderer_ofwt 0JFK]]]]. 
If the police did not find the murderer then either the murderer did not 
exist or the murderer existed but the search was not successful. Howev-
er, if the foregoing search was successful, then it is true that police found 
the murderer: 
 wt [0FindSwt 0Police [wt [0Murder_ofwt 0JFK]]] 
and the murderer existed. Hence, a successful search, i.e. finding after a 
foregoing search, also triggers an existential commitment:  
 wt [0FindSwt 0Police [wt [0Murderer_ofwt 0JFK]]] 
  
 wt [0Existwt [wt [0Murderer_ofwt 0JFK]]] 
In order to render this entailment, we explicate finding after a foregoing 
search in a manner similar to causing (x  ; c; Success_Search/ 
()):  
 wt [0FindSwt x c] = 
wt [[0Existwt c]  [[0Existwt c]  [0Success_Searchwt x c]]] 
 wt [0FindSwt x c] = 
wt [[0Existwt c]  [[0Existwt c]  [0Success_Searchwt x c]]]. 
Thus the analysis of such an explication of the sentence “The police found 
the murderer of JFK” comes down to this Closure: 
wt [[0Existwt wt [0Murderer_ofwt 0JFK]]  
[[0Existwt wt [0Murderer_ofwt 0JFK]]  
[0Success_Searchwt 0Police wt [0Murderer_ofwt 0JFK]]]] 
From this analysis one can validly infer that the murderer exists and that 
the search was successful, just as we ought to be able to. And if the so 
constructed proposition is not true, then the murderer does not exist or 
the murder does exist, only the search did not meet with success. 
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 4  Concluding Remarks  
 In this paper I demonstrated the semantic character of the ambiva-
lence concerning the topic-focus articulation of sentences. Using the pro-
cedural semantics of TIL, we were able to provide rigorous analyses 
such that sentences differing only in their topic-focus articulation are 
assigned different constructions producing different propositions and 
having different consequences.  
 We showed that a definite description occurring in the topic of a sen-
tence with de re supposition corresponds to the Strawsonian analysis, 
while a definite description occurring in the focus with de dicto supposi-
tion corresponds to the Russellian analysis. While the clause standing in 
the topic generates the case of a presupposition, a focus-clause usually 
entails rather than presupposes another proposition. 
 Moreover, the proposed analysis of Russellian descriptions does not 
deprive the description of meaning. Just the opposite; ‘the F’ receives a 
context-invariant meaning. I also demonstrated that Donnellan-style 
referential and attributive uses of an occurrence of ‘the F’ does not 
bring about a shift of meaning of ‘the F’. Instead, one and the same 
context-invariant meaning is a constituent of different procedures that 
behave in different ways. Thus both Russellian opponents and propo-
nents are partly right and partly wrong, and Strawson was right con-
cerning the case of using ‘the F’ with de re supposition in the topic of a 
sentence.  
 The input for our method is the output of a linguistic annotation 
providing labels for the topic-focus articulation. The fine-grained hyper-
intensional method of analysis as presented in this paper can contribute 
to disambiguation of a sentence by making these hidden features explicit 
and logically tractable. In case there are more non-equivalent senses of a 
sentence we furnish the sentence with different meanings. Thus in my 
opinion theoretical linguistics and logic must collaborate and walk hand 
in hand.  
VSB-Technical University Ostrava  
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708 33 Ostrava  
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